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Article

Reclaiming the Long History of the “Irrelevant”
Nineteenth Amendment for Gender Equality
Tracy Thomas†
INTRODUCTION
The Nineteenth Amendment has been called an “irrelevant”
amendment.1 The women’s suffrage amendment has been deemed irrelevant as a constitutional authority and reduced to a historical footnote.2 As Supreme Court Justice John Harlan noted, “The Nineteenth
Amendment merely gives the vote to women.”3 With that simple task
accomplished, the amendment has been assumed to offer little guidance to modern constitutional analysis or gender equality law. The
Nineteenth Amendment has become a “constitutional orphan,” disconnected from its historical origins and legal place in the Constitution.4
This constricting view of the Nineteenth Amendment ignores the
structural implications and significant history of this gendered
amendment and women’s fight for civil rights. Women battled for sev-

† Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director for the Center for Constitutional Law, The University of Akron School of Law. Copyright © 2021 by Tracy
Thomas.
1. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 965 (2002); see David A. Strauss, The
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1500 (2001)
(“[T]here is less to the Nineteenth Amendment than meets the eye.”); Akhil Reed Amar,
Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 471–73 (1995).
2. Steve Kolbert, The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power (but First,
Which One Is the Nineteenth Amendment, Again?), 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 507, 508–09
(2016).
3. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 386 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN: GENDER EQUALITY AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (2020).
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enty-two years to demand recognition of their rights from a lawmaking group of men from which they were excluded.5 It was not pretty.
Women marched in the streets, facing violence and protestors; they
were jailed, treated inhumanely, ridiculed in the press, demeaned by
ministers and leaders, and reviled by other women. Women were not
given the right—they fought for it.
The Nineteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.”6 It includes an enforcement clause, providing that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”7 It was first envisioned
by feminist pioneer Elizabeth Cady Stanton as a proposed Sixteenth
Amendment that would be part of the radical Reconstruction Amendments of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.8
Stanton’s original Sixteenth Amendment had broader language,
providing that the right to vote “shall be based on citizenship, and
shall be regulated by Congress,” and all citizens of the United States
“shall enjoy this right equally, without any distinction or discrimination whatever founded on sex.”9 It was this language nationalizing suffrage that was first introduced into Congress by Representative
George W. Julian of Indiana, as the Sixteenth Amendment in March
1869.10 Almost ten years later, in January 1878, Senator Aaron Sargent
of California introduced the women’s suffrage amendment into the
Senate, changing the language to match the text of the Fifteenth
Amendment, successfully ratified in 1870.11 The women’s suffrage
5. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, SUFFRAGE: WOMEN’S LONG BATTLE FOR THE VOTE (2020);
AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890–1920, at 5
(1965) (reporting that suffrage women conducted 480 state legislative campaigns, 277
state convention campaigns, 19 campaigns to Congress, and 41 state amendment campaigns).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
7. Id.
8. Kimberly A. Hamlin, The Nineteenth Amendment: The Fourth Reconstruction
Amendment?, 11 CONLAWNOW 103, 103 (2020); see also ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
9. Ann D. Gordon, Many Pathways to Suffrage, Other Than the 19th Amendment,
11 CONLAWNOW 91, 96 (2020); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Sixteenth Amendment, REVOLUTION, Apr. 29, 1869, reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON
AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 236, 236–38 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 2000).
10. H.R.J. Res. 15, 41st Cong. (1st Sess. 1869); see LISA TETRAULT, THE MYTH OF SENECA FALLS: MEMORY AND THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1848–1898, at 32 (2014);
Gordon, supra note 9, at 95–96.
11. S. Res. 12, 45th Cong. (2d Sess. 1878); TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 103; Gordon, supra note 9, at 95.
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amendment languished in congressional committees, including the
Senate Committee on Woman’s Suffrage formed in 1882, despite
women’s annual pilgrimages and continuous lobbying of Congress.12
It came to the Senate floor for a vote only twice, in January 1887 where
it was crushed in defeat by a two-thirds majority, and defeated again
in March 1914.13 The amendment would finally arise out of the postWorld War I haze. It was passed by Congress as the Nineteenth
Amendment on June 4, 1919, fifty years after it was first introduced,
and ratified by the required two-thirds of the states on August 26,
1920.14 Tennessee was the final state to ratify the amendment, where
the entire national movement came down to one state, and one man,
who ultimately changed his vote to support women’s suffrage because
of his mother.15
Yet, the long history of the Nineteenth Amendment and its representation of women’s broader civil rights is so much more than a simple legislative account of the passage of a constitutional amendment.
The conventional narrative misses much of the story. Students from
elementary to high school learn only few sentences about Susan B. Anthony or the Seneca Falls Convention, where women’s suffrage was
first proposed on July 19, 1848.16 Few, if any, law students study the
Nineteenth Amendment. Historical and legal narratives ignore the social, legal, and normative effects of the amendment. And we whitewash the history, omitting the Black and minority women leading the
movement, and ignoring the racism encapsulated in a separate Fifteenth Amendment and the political movement for and against it.
Beyond correcting the historical record, appreciating the relevance of the long history of the Nineteenth Amendment is significant
for two key reasons. First, the full history of the Nineteenth Amend-

12. Timeline: The Senate and the 19th Amendment, U.S. SENATE, https://www
.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/People/Women/Nineteenth_Amendment_
Vertical_Timeline.htm [https://perma.cc/8DYU-Q29G].
13. 49 CONG. REC. 1002–03 (1887); Gordon, supra note 9, at 96 (reporting the
1887 Senate vote of sixteen yeas to thirty-four nays). The 1914 vote was thirty-five to
thirty-four, but still eleven votes less than the required two-thirds majority. Timeline,
supra note 12.
14. H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong. (1919); Amendment to the Constitution, 1920, 41
Stat. 1823, 1823 (1920) (certifying ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures on August 26, 1920).
15. ELAINE WEISS, THE WOMAN’S HOUR: THE GREAT FIGHT TO WIN THE VOTE 1–4
(2019); Anastatia Sims, Armageddon in Tennessee: The Final Battle over the Nineteenth
Amendment, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT
333, 336, 346 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995).
16. Timeline, supra note 12.
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ment is relevant and important for appreciating women’s longstanding demands for legal rights. They sought the vote for seventy-two
long years. Suffrage was not obtained over polite tea, but actively demanded by women in rough protests in the streets; protests that saw
opposition, violence, and imprisonment. Women were denied rights
over and over again, with states retracting rights even as they granted
them. Nevertheless, they persisted. Women started a civil rights
movement, and it began long before the women’s liberation of the
1970s.
The long history of the Nineteenth Amendment is also relevant
and important for interpreting modern constitutional guarantees of
gender equality. Legal scholars have argued for a more robust reading
of the Nineteenth Amendment, substituting a “thick” construction of
the amendment for the existing “thin” construction which improperly
neutralizes the law.17 This thicker meaning would recognize a broader
constitutional norm about women’s citizenship and gender equality.18
Reading the Nineteenth Amendment in harmony with the Constitution’s equality amendment and incorporating the history of the
women’s suffrage movement justifies this more expansive understanding and interpretation of constitutional gender equality.
Understanding the full, long history of the Nineteenth Amendment is thus critical on many levels. This history is the history of much
more than the vote.19 It is the history of women’s civil rights, their demand for social, legal, and religious rights.20 It is the history of
women’s social movements, with suffrage activism predating and
modeling activism like today’s #MeToo and Women’s Marches. And it

17. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 2; Siegel, supra note 1, at 1022; Reva B. Siegel, The
Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE L.J.F. 450
(2020); Neil S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the
Centennial, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 235, 243–45 (2020) [hereinafter Siegel, Why
the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today]; Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thick
and Thin Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right To Vote and Congress’s Power
To Enforce It, 108 GEO. L.J. 27, 32–33 (2020).
18. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at ix, 2–3.
19. Tracy A. Thomas, More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for
Gender Equality, 15 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 349, 350, 355–58 (2020).
20. W. William Hodes, Women and the Constitution: Some Legal History and a New
Approach to the Nineteenth Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26, 49 (1970) (“[I]t is clear
that much more than the right to vote was at stake—a whole new way of life was being
established for women.”).
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is the history of feminist legal theory, birthing the theoretical foundations of situating women’s place in the law and deconstructing and
criticizing laws of male bias and women’s oppression.21
The history discussed here seeks to provide this significant legal
history in one concise overview. This format limits the rich detail and
robust understanding of all the permutations of a century of activism,
but it provides a starting point for a more complete picture that moves
beyond the single sentences in our conventional understanding. This
Article first discusses the advent of the women’s suffrage movement,
officially begun at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 arising out of the
abolitionist movement against slavery. It reveals the diversity of supporters and comprehensive feminist issues in this nascent movement
that promised a broad social revolution for women’s rights. Part II
then follows this bright promise into the darker years of schism, as
women’s suffrage organizations and women’s issues splintered across
political divides. Coalitions with conservative women’s groups advanced the cause of suffrage even as they doused the promise of feminism. Part III then addresses the continued opposition and barriers
to women’s suffrage from sexism, racism, and Reconstruction politics.
It highlights women’s persistence and increasing militantism to push
the public and political will to support suffrage. Part IV then traces the
post-Nineteenth Amendment period, and its Jane and Jim Crow restrictions of women’s suffrage and civil rights. Post-ratification interpretations of the Nineteenth Amendment restricted corollary political
rights for women like jury service and denied minority women the
right to vote. And labor activism led away from the original feminist
promise of the demand for systemic change. This history of the Nineteenth Amendment ultimately stands for the deep persistence of feminism, legal reform for women’s rights, and the demand for gender
equality that has achieved tangible success even as its full promise
was never realized.
I. IN THE BEGINNING: IGNITING THE SUFFRAGE FIRE
The beginning of the women’s suffrage movement is typically located at the first woman’s rights convention held at Seneca Falls, New
York, in July 1848.22 This was not, however, the first time women had
21. Tracy A. Thomas, The Long History of Feminist Legal Theory, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FEMINISM AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Deborah L. Brake, Martha Chamallas & Verna L. Williams eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1, 12), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3740082 [https://perma.cc/V7G6-V7XX].
22. JUDITH WELLMAN, THE ROAD TO SENECA FALLS: ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND THE
FIRST WOMAN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION 10–11, 183 (2004).
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considered voting. Women had voted for thirty years in colonial New
Jersey beginning in 1776, where the state constitution allowed “all inhabitants” to vote and statutes defined voters inclusively as “he or
she.”23 Subsequent constitutional revisions retracted this original contract, despite women’s legal challenge.24
Women had also previously demanded the right to vote, from socialist feminist Frances Wright to abolitionists Sarah and Angelina
Grimké, to a handful of women petitioning the New York State Constitutional Convention in 1846.25 At Seneca Falls, pioneering feminist
Elizabeth Cady Stanton revived this idea of suffrage as central to
women’s citizenship and equality.
Stanton and her mentor Lucretia Mott organized at Seneca Falls
a convention of three hundred people to discuss the social, civil, and
religious oppressed condition of women.26 They issued a written document, the Declaration of Sentiments, declaring the wrongs against
women and demanded legal rights of gender equality in marriage, parenting, employment, education, and the removal of social barriers of
separate spheres created by religion and society.27 The revolutionary
declaration demanded systemic reform in multiple systems of the
state, family, market, and church as together they created “a fourfold
bondage” with “many cords tightly twisted together, strong for one

23. Campbell Curry-Ledbetter, Note, Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey 1776–1807:
A Political Weapon, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 705 (2020); Judith Apter Klinghoffer & Lois
Elkis, “The Petticoat Electors”: Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776–1807, 12 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 159 (1992).
24. See Carpenter v. Cornish, 83 N.J.L. 254 (1912) (challenging denial of women’s
state voting rights on grounds that the original state constitution authorized such voting and was improperly overturned by subsequent legislation; argument by first
woman lawyer in the state, Mary Philbrook); PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at 438 (N.J. Writers’ Project of the Work Projects Admin. ed., 1942) (reporting a petition to restore women’s voting rights).
25. Jacob Katz Cogan & Lori D. Ginzberg, 1846 Petition for Woman’s Suffrage, New
York State Constitutional Convention, 22 SIGNS 427, 429 (1997); Gerda Lerner, The
Meanings of Seneca Falls, 1848–1998, DISSENT, Fall 1998, at 35, 38 (stating that abolitionists Sarah and Angelina Grimké advocated women’s rights to vote and hold office
in 1838 as did feminist theorist Frances Wright in the 1830s).
26. TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 31–33; NANCY ISENBERG, SEX AND CITIZENSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, at xviii (1998); see also TRACY A. THOMAS, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON
AND THE FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS OF FAMILY LAW 7–8 (2016).
27. REPORT OF THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT SENECA FALLS, JULY 19–20,
1848, reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 75, 76–79 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1998).
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purpose” of woman’s oppression and subordination.28 The Declaration also more philosophically “denounced the entrenched social
norms that fostered male privilege, female inferiority, religious subjugation, and double standards of morality and sexuality.”29
The vote emerged as one key demand from Seneca Falls. Stanton
identified the vote as central to protecting women’s rights because it
granted them access to the lawmaking process and required lawmakers to be responsive to women’s issues and concerns.30 She understood suffrage as the hallmark of citizenship, designating respect and
power within society.31 And she understood the vote as both a barrier
and vehicle for legal change, based on her de facto legal education under the tutelage of her lawyer and jurist father.32 Lucretia Mott viewed
the vote with suspicion, for Mott, as a Quaker and Garrisonian abolitionist, considered politics morally corrupt and sought to persuade
the public directly of the truth of abolition and equality rather than
participate in a tainted political process.33
The first women’s rights convention was Stanton’s idea, arising
initially out of discussions she had with Mott at the World’s Anti-slavery Convention in London in 1840.34 Stanton traveled there on her
honeymoon and met Mott and other American and English abolitionists.35 At the convention, women were banned from participating on
the floor, relegated to observing in the balcony, where leader William
Lloyd Garrison joined them.36 Many women followed Garrison and his
organization more generally because “he insisted that women’s rights
could not be separated from those of black people and of all humanity,

28. Thomas, supra note 19, at 350; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Degradation of
Disfranchisement: Address by ECS to the National-American Woman Suffrage Association (Feb. 26, 1891), in 5 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN
B. ANTHONY 360, 366 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 2009).
29. Thomas, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4).
30. SUE DAVIS, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 64–66 (2008).
31. Id. at 90; JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 108–09 (1994).
32. THOMAS, supra note 26, at 41–42; Thomas, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4–5).
33. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 66; Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the
Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820–1878,
74 J. AM. HIST. 836, 840–41 (1987).
34. ELISABETH GRIFFITH, IN HER OWN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 8–
11 (1984).
35. Id. at 48–50; LORI D. GINZBERG, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: AN AMERICAN LIFE 34–
41 (2009).
36. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, at 61 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881).
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while political abolitionists tended to see women’s rights as a distraction.”37 The related so-called “woman question” arising at the convention and elsewhere debated whether women should have public roles
within the abolitionist movement.38 The same controversy had engulfed early anti-slavery reformers Angelina and Sarah Grimké,
daughters of a Southern slave holding family who were persuasive
speakers against the horrors of slavery.39 Sarah Grimké would go beyond the mere question of women’s public role, addressing a wider
range of women’s rights in her work, Letters on the Equality of the
Sexes.40 Stanton and Mott reconnected eight years later at Mott’s sister-in-law’s home near Stanton’s hometown of Seneca Falls. Stanton
was riled up from her frustration with domestic responsibilities and
limited legal rights and was committed to starting a revolution.41
The “woman’s suffrage movement,” as it was called, using the singular term “woman,” thus grew directly out of the anti-slavery movement.42 Stanton later explained that in the early anti-slavery conventions, “the broad principles of human rights were so exhaustively
discussed, justice, liberty, and equality, so clearly taught, that the
women who crowded to listen, readily learned the lesson of freedom
for themselves, and early began to take part in the debates and business affairs of all associations.”43
Women reformers were allied with Black reformers, including
Frederick Douglass who attended Seneca Falls, and women like Sojourner Truth and Frances Harper.44 Civil and religious reformers
worked together for universal suffrage. It was a united front for citizenship and enfranchisement without discrimination on the basis of
race or gender.

37. FAYE E. DUDDEN, FIGHTING CHANCE: THE STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND
BLACK SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA 4 (2011).
38. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, supra note 36, at 53.
39. See generally GERDA LERNER, THE GRIMKÉ SISTERS FROM SOUTH CAROLINA: PIONEERS FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ABOLITION 11–19 (1971).
40. SARAH GRIMKÉ, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES (1838).
41. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE: REMINISCENCES 1815–1897,
147–48 (1898).
42. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM & SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848–1869, at 31 (1978).
43. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, supra note 36, at 52.
44. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 153; see MARTHA S. JONES, ALL BOUND UP TOGETHER: THE
WOMAN QUESTION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN PUBLIC CULTURE, 1830–1900, at 135 (2007);
ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 1850–
1920, at 13–17 (1998).
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The ideas of Seneca Falls were also inspired and influenced by the
matriarchal governance of the Iroquois Nation.45 The laws of the Native American Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) Confederacy, made up of the
Seneca, Onondaga, Mohawk, Oneida, Cayuga, and Tuscarora living in
the New York region, had a profound impact on suffrage leaders like
Stanton, Mott, and Matilda Joslyn Gage.46 The Iroquois had a Council
of Matrons or Clan Mothers, women leaders who voted on the chief. A
man could be elected leader only if nominated by a woman.47 Women
participated in all decision making, controlled the land and food resources, and had the power to veto war. Women could call for a man’s
removal from the community for murder, theft, or sexual assault.48 A
man who committed sexual assault was banished, scarred, or killed.
The Iroquois believed that women as “life givers” had the right to decide when life was taken.49 Women had control over their own bodies
and choice of sexual partners, and were free to divorce. The Iroquois
also had a constitution, which expressly gave rights to women.50 All of
this offered suffrage leaders early in the movement an alternative
model of a successful, organized government that could equalize
rights of women.
Following Seneca Falls, grassroots women’s rights conventions
proliferated.51 Groups meeting in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio began to construct a national network of organization
and activism for women’s suffrage.52 Conventions would be held each

45. See SALLY ROESCH WAGNER, SISTERS IN SPIRIT: HAUDENOSAUNEE (IROQUOIS) INFLUEARLY AMERICAN FEMINISTS 28 (2001); THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, at
xxiii, 2–22 (Sally Roesch Wagner ed., 2019).
46. THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 45, at 2–22; WAGNER, supra note
45, at 32; Jessica Nordell, Millions of Women Voted This Election: They Have the Iroquois
To Thank, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2016/11/24/millions-of-women-voted-for-hillary-clinton-they
-have-the-iroquois-to-thank [https://perma.cc/V8DU-TCT4]; see also MATILDA JOSLYN
GAGE, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE 10 (1893).
47. Nordell, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Renée Jacobs, Note, Iroquois Great Law of Peace and the United States Constitution: How the Founding Fathers Ignored the Clan Mothers, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497
(1991).
51. DUBOIS, supra note 5; DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 60.
52. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, supra note 36, at 75, 103–04, 111,
201, 320.
ENCE ON
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year for decades, consistently and persistently acting for women’s suffrage at the local to the national level.53 At the conventions, women
gathered, documented their concerns, and planned canvassing and
petitioning work for the next year. The vote was a primary issue addressed in these conventions, although they also commonly discussed
issues of marital property and marriage.54
One particular convention that history has remembered is that of
the 1851 convention in Akron, Ohio, where former slave and activist
Sojourner Truth emerged as the heroine. Truth is said to have taken
the podium to decry the disconnect between Black and women’s suffrage, stating “Ain’t I a woman,”55 a speech that has become “a canonical text in accounts of nineteenth century feminism and of the role of
Black women in the fight for woman suffrage.”56
Historians, however, have questioned whether this in fact happened in this way, noting that the white abolitionist and suffragist
Frances Barker Gage who recorded the narrative may have manipulated the actual event by misquoting or infusing her own agenda and
implicit bias into Truth’s words.57
This history of woman’s suffrage would later be mythologized by
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage in
their History of Woman Suffrage.58 The edited six-volume work was a
dedicated effort of the suffrage leaders to preserve women’s history,
collecting reports and procedural histories from the affiliated state
53. For example, Salem, Ohio (1850), Akron, Ohio (1851), Cleveland (1853), Cincinnati (1855). Id. at 103–04, 111, 124, 164.
54. Id. at 107; see THOMAS, supra note 26, at 53, 60, 77, 163.
55. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, supra note 36, at 115–17.
56. Linda C. McClain, What Becomes a Legendary Constitutional Campaign Most?
Marking the Nineteenth Amendment at One Hundred, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1753, 1755
(2020); see also Lolita Buckner Inniss, “While the Water Is Stirring”: Sojourner Truth as
Proto-Agonist in the Fight for (Black) Women’s Rights, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1637, 1647
(2020).
57. See NELL IRVIN PAINTER, SOJOURNER TRUTH: A LIFE, A SYMBOL 334 (1997); Inniss,
supra note 56, at 1647 (“Perhaps one of the best known speeches attributed to Truth,
the 1851 ‘Ain’t I a Woman’ speech, which highlighted both gender and racial discrimination, may have been misquoted or largely fabricated by white abolitionist and suffragist Frances Dana Barker Gage.”).
58. TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 112–44; see also 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
1848–1861, supra note 36; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–1876 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881); 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1876–1885 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage
eds., 1886); 4 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1883–1900 (Susan B. Anthony & Ida
Husted Harper eds., 1902); 5 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1900–1920 (Ida Husted
Harper ed., 1922); 6 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1900–1920 (Ida Husted Harper
ed., 1922).

2021]

RECLAIMING NINETEENTH AMENDMENT HISTORY

2633

suffrage groups.59 For women’s history was otherwise excluded from
mainstream history, a history dominated by military and political history of great men and great wars.60 Stanton and Anthony wanted to
make sure that the great women’s political movement was not forgotten, and that it was appropriately revered.61 Yet the History of Woman
Suffrage also changes history by what it left out. It omitted many of the
Black women leaders of the movement and those outside the immediate network of the editors working in rival, conservative suffrage organizations.
After the Civil War, the vote emerged as the key civil right and
distinction of citizenship. Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Amendments focused the national conversation on federal constitutional
change, and particularly on the power of the vote prioritized in the
Fifteenth Amendment.62 Women’s rights advocates were drawn into
this constitutional debate, forced to narrow their focus and prioritize
the national dialogue on suffrage.63 While thus elevating the movement for women’s right to vote, it also diminished the broader feminist movement for women’s citizenship and civil rights expansively
envisioned at Seneca Falls.64
II. SCHISM OVER THE CONSTITUTION: DOUSING THE FLAMES OF
FEMINISM
Following the Civil War, the unified reformers and universal suffrage movement disintegrated.65 The focus of the Civil War and Reconstruction on racial equality, at least for men, directed reformers efforts
solely to Black suffrage.66 Abolitionists championed Black suffrage
only, claiming this was “the Negro’s hour,” and abandoning their past
commitment to universal suffrage and women’s rights.67

59. See sources cited supra note 58.
60. See generally Gerda Lerner, Placing Women in History: Definitions and Challenges, 3 FEMINIST STUD. 5 (1975) (discussing the early stages of development of
“women’s history as an independent field” in the 1970s).
61. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, supra note 36, at 7; see TETRAULT,
supra note 10, at 4, 9, 112–13.
62. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 54.
63. Thomas, supra note 19, at 351.
64. Id. at 352 (“As Stanton later recalled, the vote was not the central idea of Seneca Falls, but rather ‘the social wrongs of my sex occupied altogether the larger place’
in the early movement.”).
65. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 54–55.
66. Id. at 59.
67. DUDDEN, supra note 37, at 8.
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The Civil Rights Amendments embodied this narrowed definition
of human rights. The Fifteenth Amendment, passed in 1870, provided
that the vote “shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race.”68
A proposed universal suffrage amendment submitted to Congress in
December 1868 by Senator Samuel Pomeroy of Kansas had been
quickly tabled.69 The Fourteenth Amendment, passed in 1868, protected privileges and immunities of citizenship, and guaranteed due
process and equal protection.70 But section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment also enforced the right to vote in both federal and state
elections by counting only “male inhabitants” and “male citizens.”71
Women’s rights advocates decried the new insertion of the word
male into the Constitution and the creation of what Elizabeth Cady
Stanton called an “aristocracy of sex” in its hierarchy privileging men’s
citizenship.72 Stanton felt so betrayed by her former colleagues that
she left the abolition movement, and she and Anthony formed their
own National Woman Suffrage Association (National Association) in
May 1869.73 “But standing alone,” they said, “we learned our power.”74
The National Association opposed the Fifteenth Amendment due to its
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
69. Timeline, supra note 12. The proposed universal suffrage amendment would
have provided that “[t]he basis of suffrage in the United States shall be that of citizenship, and all native or naturalized citizens shall enjoy the same rights and privileges of
the elective franchise.” Id.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives of Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twentyone years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.
Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
72. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–1876, supra note 58, at 324, 335; see
LAUREN E. FREE, SUFFRAGE RECONSTRUCTED: GENDER, RACE, AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 2–3 (2015) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s gendered language); 2
THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY, supra note 9,
at xxiii–xxiv (“Advocates of universal suffrage coined the phrase, ‘an aristocracy of sex,’
to express their belief that the basic precepts of American government had been violated. A ‘genuine Republic’ would not have created dominant and subordinate categories of citizenship for men and women.”).
73. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–1876, supra note 58, at 400–01; DUDDEN,
supra note 37, at 180.
74. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–1876, supra note 58, at 267.
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exclusion of women and lobbied against the amendment even though
they and their members uniformly endorsed Black suffrage generally.75
Stanton’s willingness to resort to racist extremes in her outrage
led to further division between the formerly allied suffragists and abolitionists.76 In challenging the Fifteenth Amendment, Stanton said that
while white women had been staunch supporters of “freedom for the
Negro,” the “Negro was no longer the ‘lowest in the scale of being’” and
that it “becomes a serious question whether we had better stand aside
and see ‘Sambo’ walk into the kingdom first.”77 Elsewhere she expressed outrage that “lower orders” of uneducated men like “Patrick
and Sambo and Hans and Yung Tung” would legislate for white
women.78 Black leaders called out Stanton and Anthony for their denigration of Black men and their dismissal of Black voting rights, while
others like Frances W. Harper, Mary Church Terrell, and anti-lynching
activist Ida B. Wells-Barnett continued to affiliate with the National
Association.79 “Yet the race-gender split of 1869 cannot simply be explained as a product of racism among white feminists, although racism
there was, and plenty of it.”80 For it was the broader political and legal
movement that discounted and abandoned women’s rights that contributed to the divorce.81
In response, Lucy Stone and her husband Henry Blackwell
formed the competing American Woman Suffrage Association (American Association) that same year.82 The American Association worked
75. Id. at 314–19, 334–38; DUDDEN, supra note 37, at 166, 168–69.
76. DUDDEN, supra note 37, at 3, 166–70.
77. E. Cady Stanton, This Is the Negro’s Hour, NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Dec.
30, 1865.
78. E.C.S., Manhood Suffrage, REVOLUTION, Dec. 24, 1868, at 392; see also Elizabeth
Cady Stanton, Anniversary of American Equal Rights Association: Address of Elizabeth
Cady Stanton, in REVOLUTION, May 13, 1869, at 289, 290–91; Michele Mitchell, “Lower
Orders,” Racial Hierarchies, and Rights Rhetoric, in ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: FEMINIST
AS THINKER 128, 137 (Ellen Carol DuBois & Richard Cándida Smith eds., 2007).
79. See LOUISE MICHELE NEWMAN, WHITE WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE RACIAL ORIGINS OF
FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1999); TERBORG-PENN, supra note 44, at 8; ANGELA Y.
DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS, 83 (1981); Christine Stansell, Missed Connections: Abolitionist Feminism in the Nineteenth Century, in ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: FEMINIST AS
THINKER, supra note 78, at 32.
80. DUDDEN, supra note 37.
81. Id. at 3–12.
82. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 195–96; TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 34. See generally
Andrea Moore Kerr, White Women’s Rights, Black Men’s Wrongs, Free Love, Blackmail,
and the Formation of the American Woman Suffrage Association, in ONE WOMAN, ONE
VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 61–78.
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first for Black suffrage, turning to women’s suffrage only after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.83 It also disagreed with the National Association on process, allowing men in leadership, prioritizing
state campaigns, and conservatively opposing the National’s more
radical agenda of marriage and divorce equality.84 The rival organizations were fueled by personal animosities, complicating the tensions
and slowing down the progress.85
Given the constitutional focus on voting, suffrage emerged after
the Civil War as the key hallmark of political citizenship and civil
equality.86 Federal, not state law, became the primary guarantor of
civil rights, and the Constitution the avenue for those rights.87 Stanton’s proposed Sixteenth Amendment advanced in 1869 was intended
to be a part of this greater constitutional movement.88 Necessitated by
the textual gender gaps of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
women’s right to vote was still envisioned as part of the second reconstruction of the Constitution that emphasized the individual rights of
citizenship, equality, and liberty.89 The women’s suffrage amendment
has only failed to be appreciated as part of this larger constitutional
reconstruction because it took another fifty years before it was
passed, long after the Reconstruction era.
At the same time, suffrage leaders affiliated with the National Association crafted a new strategy called the “New Departure.”90 This
approach departed from the prior strategies of a federal suffrage
amendment and state-by-state campaigns and instead focused on a legal argument of existing citizenship guaranteed under the new 1868
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.91 The
women argued that the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”92
83. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 198.
84. See id. at 195–200 (describing the American Association’s strategies and how
they contrasted with the National Association).
85. See TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 7 (“Battles over the relationship of black men’s
suffrage and women’s suffrage divided activists in an acrimonious split that would last
the rest of the century.”).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 62–63.
87. FONER, supra note 8, at xx, 11.
88. Hamlin, supra note 8, at 103.
89. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 62. See generally FONER, supra note 10 (recounting
the Reconstruction amendments and the universal suffrage movement).
90. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 85.
91. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–1876, supra note 58, at 407, 520; see also
Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,”
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1476 (2001).
92. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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which included voting as the key privilege of citizenship and as interpreted within the analogous text of Article IV of the Constitution regarding state citizenship rights.93 On the basis of this authority, many
women nationwide went to the polls and attempted to vote.94
The most famous was Susan Anthony, who was arrested for illegal voting.95 Anthony’s case, however, would not be the legal test case
as initially hoped, because an unusual procedural ruling by the trial
judge refusing to enforce the criminal penalty cut off the opportunity
for appeal and review.96
Instead, Virginia Minor became the test case in the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Minor v. Happersett, the Court agreed that women were citizens, a proposition that had been in question.97 However, it held the
privileges and immunities of federal citizenship do not include the
right to vote.98 The right to vote, it held, was a right of state citizenship
and thus was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.99 The
Court rejected what seemed plainly obvious to the women—that the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to alter the original constitutional compact by shifting protection of civil rights like voting from the states to the federal government because the states had proven they could not be trusted to do
so.100
93. Siegel, supra note 1, at 971–72. They relied on Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), which found the elective franchise to be one of the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship protected against infringement by other states under
Article IV of the Constitution. DuBois, supra note 33, at 852; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–1876, supra note 58, at 453.
94. CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE & POLITICS:
THE INNER STORY OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 85 (Dover Publ’ns Inc. 2020) (1923).
95. United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459); see
ANN D. GORDON, FED. JUD. CTR., THE TRIAL OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 1 (2005), https://www.fjc
.gov/history/cases/famous-federal-trials/us-v-susan-b-anthony-fight-womens
-suffrage [https://perma.cc/6ETU-ZFA8]; see also DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 98–100.
96. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 100.
97. 88 U.S. 162, 165, 169–70 (1874).
98. Id. A few lower courts had similarly rejected the privileges and immunities
theory, following the lead of an 1871 House Judiciary report by Fourteenth Amendment drafter John Bingham stating that the amendment was not intended to grant
women suffrage. DuBois, supra note 33, at 857; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861–
1876, supra note 58, at 461–63.
99. See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138–39 (1873) (rejecting
argument that Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause protects married woman’s right to practice law).
100. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 52–53 (1873) (explaining
that the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause “struck at, and forever destroyed” state-only citizenship and instead incorporated the idea of national
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The division between the American and National Associations
was further entrenched by the integration of the conservative, alcohol
prohibition group, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union
(WCTU).101 The WCTU supported women’s right to vote as a way to
bring women’s moral superiority into the corrupt political arena of
lawmaking and sought to elevate women’s domestic role in the family
and the larger family of society.102 These maternalists reified women’s
mothering role and women’s biological and caregiving difference.
They stood in stark contrast to the radical feminists of the National
organization, who challenged women’s subordinate role in the family
and society, gendered social norms and systems, and sought formal
equality for women. The WCTU, however, brought with it a significant
increase in numbers of supporters, greater visibility, and more financial backing.103 Eventually, the National and American suffrage organizations merged into one, becoming the National American Woman’s
Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1890.104 Yet, even as this broader
consensus among women expanded the suffrage movement, it contracted the feminist promise of the movement for broader equal
rights.105 The vote became the only ground of consensus among the
diverse range of women, coalescing at the lowest common denominator of the vote, silencing other important demands from Seneca
Falls.106
III. STATE STRATEGIES: KEEPING THE EMBERS BURNING
The women’s suffrage movement renewed its focus on state-bystate efforts, forced back to that strategy by the Supreme Court’s decision in Minor and the leadership of the American suffrage organization. “[The] state-by-state effort spun the main thread of suffrage activity,” and the galvanizing refrain had been to “[w]in more States to

citizenship because of “an apprehension of a destructive faculty in State governments”
and to place the states under the “oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress”).
101. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 106–12; Carolyn DeSwarte Gifford, Frances Willard
and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union’s Conversion to Woman Suffrage, in ONE
WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at
117. See generally RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND LIBERTY, 1873–1900 (1990).
102. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 109–10.
103. Id. at 106–07.
104. TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 159–60.
105. Thomas, supra note 21 (manuscript at 12).
106. Id.
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full woman suffrage.”107 This state approach, however, would prove to
be a slow, glacial process with little to show for it after forty years.
One of the “most ambitious and consequential of these statelevel” campaigns was Kansas in 1867.108 The American Equal Rights
Association, a group of both Black and white feminist-abolitionists
seeking universal suffrage rights for all, optimistically targeted the
new territory.109 Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony campaigned on the ground across the state.110 Despite the supposed unified interests, the suffrage question was split into two constitutional
provisions in Kansas—one for Black suffrage and one for women’s
suffrage.111 The reformers thus found themselves working against
each other. Both failed.112
Animosities over the campaign and finances began the split between Stanton and Anthony and the abolitionists.113 It led Stanton and
Anthony to seek their own voice and leadership apart from the abolitionists, culminating in their own national suffrage organization and
newspaper, The Revolution.114 Indeed, they shocked their reformer
colleagues by financing their paper through George Train, a wealthy
promoter and showman, known for his vocal racism.115 Stanton replied only that she would “accept aid from the devil himself” in order
to use her own standards and vehicle for the women’s rights cause.116
The Revolution survived for only three years, done in by limited finances once Train was arrested and deported to Ireland.
Women’s suffrage activism then entered a period of several decades that historians have labelled “the doldrums.”117 Energy, efforts,
and public appeal of suffrage waned as the marathon work of activism
produced little results. New suffrage leaders like NAWSA’s president
107. CATT & SHULER, supra note 94, at 216.
108. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 61–69.
109. Id. at 61; TETRAULT, supra note 10, at 19–20.
110. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 66.
111. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 77–102.
112. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 68.
113. DUBOIS, supra note 42, at 99–100.
114. Id. at 103.
115. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 66–67. Train was “America’s Champion Crank” who
made and lost fortunes in shipping and streetcars. He lived an eccentric, sensational
life and dabbled in presidential politics. Just a year into The Revolution, he was extradited to Ireland and sentenced for aiding the Irish rebels. GRIFFITH, supra note 34, at
129–30, 133.
116. GRIFFITH, supra note 34, at 131.
117. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, A Short History of the Woman Suffrage Movement in
America, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 1, 14.
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Carrie Chapman Catt and Harriot Stanton Blatch (Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s daughter) worked to reinvigorate and rebuild suffrage membership and image.118 They recruited society women, college women,
working-class factory women, progressives and socialists—all in efforts to rebuild their movement and expand their constituencies.119
By 1900, after thirty years of organized effort, only four states
had passed full suffrage for women: Wyoming (1869), Utah (1870),
Colorado (1893), and Idaho (1896).120 But the tide began to turn
faster after 1910. From 1910 to 1912, six more states gained full suffrage, raising the total to ten states.121 This so-called success in the
West in the newer states of the western territory has been attributed
to these states’ more progressive pioneering spirit and the openness
of their less-entrenched political parties.122 Other factors contributing
to success in the West were the better mobilization of the women’s
suffrage movements and the social blur between the public and private spheres on the frontier where women were more likely to be active as homesteaders and in higher education.123
More generally, women’s suffragists had better success in securing partial suffrage for municipal or school board elections. Kentucky
was one of the first states to pass school board suffrage, passing it in

118. Id. at 14–15.
119. Id. at 14–16; Ellen Carol DuBois, Working Women, Class Relations, and Suffrage
Militance: Harriot Stanton Blatch and the New York Woman Suffrage Movement, 1894–
1909, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra
note 15, at 221, 223–27.
120. Wheeler, supra note 117, at 9, 11; Beverly Beeton, How the West Was Won for
Woman Suffrage, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 99, 100. The Wyoming Territory passed women’s suffrage in
1869 and passed it again in 1890 when it became a state. Utah passed women’s suffrage in 1870, but women were stripped of their right to vote by federal anti-polygamy
laws of the Edmunds-Tucker Act aimed against the Mormon territory’s polygamist
practices until Utah entered the union as a non-polygamist state. See Wheeler, supra
note 117, at 11.
121. The next states to grant women full suffrage were Washington (1910), California (1911), Oregon (1912), Kansas (1912), and Arizona (1912). See Wheeler, supra
note 117, at 11.
122. REBECCA J. MEAD, HOW THE VOTE WAS WON: WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN THE WESTERN
STATES, 1868–1914, at 1 (2004); Beeton, supra note 120, at 100; Holly J. McCammon &
Karen E. Campbell, Winning the Vote in the West: The Political Successes of the Women’s
Suffrage Movements, 1866–1919, 15 GENDER & SOC’Y 55, 59–66 (2001); Susan Schulten,
The Crooked Path to Women’s Suffrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/06/04/opinion/the-crooked-path-to-womens-suffrage.html [https://
perma.cc/Z56H-YR22].
123. MEAD, supra note 122, at 1125; McCammon & Campbell, supra note 122, at
64–66.
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1838.124 School suffrage proved to a somewhat successful strategy nationwide as seventeen other states passed school suffrage.125 There
was social acceptance of the idea of women as well-suited to issues
about children and school, although this proved counterproductive to
demands for full suffrage. Kansas was also one of the first states to
adopt municipal suffrage in 1887, allowing women to vote in the limited context of city elections.126 However, a decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court striking down its municipal suffrage law, finding no
authority for the legislature to create a new class of voters, stymied
municipal suffrage for many years.127 Illinois proved the turning point
in 1913 when its municipal suffrage law was upheld as constitutional
by its highest court.128 Ohio’s municipal suffrage law was similarly upheld as constitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court a few years later.129
Building on this limited success in partial suffrage, advocates began to invest in a new strategy of presidential suffrage.130 Presidential
suffrage was initially the idea of Henry Blackwell, seeking to grant
women the right to vote for presidential electors, and thus president,
and thought initially to be less subject to referendum or legislative
overruling.131 Illinois was the first state to pass presidential suffrage

124. See KRADITOR, supra note 5, at 4.
125. The states were Kentucky (1838), Kansas (1861), Michigan (1875), Minnesota (1875), and thirteen more by 1890. See id.; State ex rel. Mills v. Bd. of Elections, 6
Ohio Cir. Dec. 36 (Ct. App. 1895), aff’d without decision, 47 N.E. 1114 (Ohio 1896) (upholding school board suffrage).
126. CATT & SHULER, supra note 94, at 180.
127. Id.; Coffin v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs , 56 N.W. 567, 569 (Mich. 1893).
128. Scown v. Czarnecki, 106 N.E. 276, 277, 302 (Ill. 1914); CATT & SHULER, supra
note 94, at 180–82.
129. State ex rel. Taylor v. French, 117 N.E. 173, 177 (Ohio 1917).
130. CATT & SHULER, supra note 94, at 183.
131. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 185–89. “Presidential suffrage” meant the right to
vote for members of the Electoral College in each state, as set forth in Article II, section
1 of the federal Constitution authorizing the state legislature to determine the manner
of appointing presidential electors. 4 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON
AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 209 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 2006); see CATT & SHULER, supra note
93, at 180 (noting that Rhode Island was the first state to propose women’s presidential suffrage in 1892). Women’s suffrage leaders also made an argument for federal
suffrage, the right to vote in all federal elections including for members of Congress,
based on Article I, sections 2 and 4 of the Constitution. Gordon, supra note 9, at 97–99.
Suffragists utilized “all methods of trying to break men’s monopoly of political power.”
Id.
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in 1913, and five more states passed it in 1917, including North Dakota, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Indiana, and Ohio.132 A referendum in
Ohio, however, showed the weakness of this strategy.133 There opponents challenged the passage of presidential suffrage, fueled by the
deep pockets of anti-prohibition liquor interests. Florence Allen, later
the first woman federal appellate judge and a key drafter of the presidential suffrage provision in Ohio, fought the referendum in court by
challenging the many fraudulent signatures on the referendum ballots
county by county.134 But this effort was not enough, and the referendum went forward and overturned women’s presidential suffrage by
a majority of the male voters.
There was strong philosophical and financial opposition to
women’s suffrage. The primary funding and organization for the “antis” opposed to women’s suffrage came from the liquor industry.135
Liquor manufacturers, businesses, and consumers feared that
moralistic women, particularly women temperance voters, would
pass national prohibition. However, Prohibition was enacted by men;
the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted before women nationally
gained the right to vote, passing Congress in 1917 and ratified by the
states in 1919.136 Others strongly opposed women’s suffrage for the
threat to marital harmony, believing it would disrupt the household,
women’s maternal role, and social gender norms.137 And yet other vocal “antis” opposed women’s suffrage because they believed it would
trigger more progressive legislation like child labor laws, that women
were too emotional or intellectually inferior to participate in such affairs, or because they believed that women could better direct their
influence through public service work.138

132. Illinois (1913), North Dakota (1917), Nebraska (1917), Rhode Island (1917),
Indiana (1917), Ohio (1917). Appendix One, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING
THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 375–77.
133. CATT & SHULER, supra note 94, at 193–94.
134. Tracy A. Thomas, The Jurisprudence of the First Woman Judge, Florence Allen:
Challenging the Myth of Women Judging Differently, 27 WM. & MARY J. RACE GENDER &
SOC. JUST. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1, 15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3641736.
135. CATT & SHULER, supra note 94, at 125.
136. Hamlin, supra note 8, at 107; Mark Lawrence Schrad, Why Do We Blame
Women for Prohibition?, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2019/01/13/prohibition-women-blame-history-223972 [https://
perma.cc/9THN-A2L5].
137. Siegel, supra note 1, at 978–81.
138. KRADITOR, supra note 5, at 14–28; Wheeler, supra note 117, at 15; Manuela
Thurner, “Better Citizens Without the Ballot”: American Anti-Suffrage Women and Their
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By 1916, NAWSA returned to the federal constitutional amendment campaign. Officially, its leader, Carrie Chapman Catt, had
adopted the “Winning Plan,” consolidating organizational power and
pursuing a concurrent strategy of both federal amendment and partial
state suffrage.139 She accelerated federal lobbying efforts, and directed state suffrage efforts to only those states where success was
likely.140 This dilution of effort, however, from fighting the suffrage
battle on too many fronts, was challenged by the younger generation
of suffragists. These women, led by Harriot Stanton Blatch and Alice
Paul, demanded an intensification of concentrated effort on the federal amendment, and an end to the decades-long doldrums in which
women’s suffrage languished.141 Paul renamed the federal proposal
the “Susan B. Anthony Amendment” to pay tribute to its history while
refocusing efforts on a federal campaign.142
IV. PUSHING THROUGH THE FIRE OF OPPOSITION
Alice Paul led a NAWSA committee, the Congressional Union, in
its more militant efforts to generate public and political support for a
federal woman’s suffrage amendment.143 When the older generation
of suffragists represented by the old guard of Catt became embarrassed by these efforts, Paul broke off from the main women’s suffrage
organization and formed her own National Woman’s Party (NWP).144
Paul adopted tactics of publicity, parades, and protests, learned from
the English militant suffrage women led by Emmeline Pankhurst.145
One of the most well-known efforts was a parade in New York City, led
by lawyer Inez Milholland on a white horse and followed by contingents of women dressed in white, the color of moral right, with yellow
Rationale During the Progressive Era, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE
WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 203, 204–05.
139. Wheeler, supra note 117, at 17; Robert Booth Fowler, Carrie Chapman Catt,
Strategist, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT,
supra note 15, at 295, 303–04.
140. Wheeler, supra note 117, at 17.
141. Id. at 16; DuBois, supra note 119, at 237.
142. J.D. ZAHNISER & AMELIA R. FRY, ALICE PAUL: CLAIMING POWER 215 (2014); Lynda
Dodd, Sisterhood of Struggle: Leadership and Strategy in the Campaign for the Nineteenth Amendment, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY 189, 194 (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracey Jean
Boisseau eds., 2011).
143. Linda G. Ford, Alice Paul and the Triumph of Militancy, in ONE WOMAN, ONE
VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 277, 284. See
generally ZAHNISER & FRY, supra note 142.
144. Dodd, supra note 142, at 189. See generally BERNADETTE CAHILL, ALICE PAUL,
THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY AND THE VOTE (2015).
145. Ford, supra note 143, at 284; Dodd, supra note 142, at 189.
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sashes and roses for sisterhood and light, and purple connoting royalty and respect.146 Paul, however, pandering to racism, segregated
Black women to the back of the parade.147 Leader Ida B. Wells-Barnett
refused to be so discounted, and deliberately moved up her position
once the parade began.148 The parades generated publicity, but also
protest, as bystanders verbally and physically attacked the women.149
Paul further expanded her efforts into pickets of the White
House.150 She objected to President Woodrow Wilson’s refusal to support women’s suffrage and lead his Democratic party to support the
federal amendment. Now-familiar images of a small contingent of
women picketing the president antagonized Wilson and anti-suffragists. Many, including NAWSA leaders, were outraged at the theatrics,
and the blatant opposition to the president during the national crisis
of World War I. Seeking to end these embarrassing pickets, authorities
repeatedly arrested the women. The women’s mistreatment in the
D.C. jails, where they were kept in solitary isolation, went on hunger
strikes, force fed in inhumane ways, and denied outside communication, finally reached public light.151 The public outrage was immediate
and began to shift the political support in favor of women’s suffrage.
A global flu pandemic, however, in 1918 ordered people to stay at
home and thus limited “suffragists’ ability to gather for rallies and to
lobby Congress.”152
Wilson finally shifted his historical stance against women’s suffrage. In a speech to Congress, he attributed this to women’s patriotic

146. Ford, supra note 143, at 281–82; ZAHNISER & FRY, supra note 142, at 137, 145.
147. Ford, supra note 143, at 140–42, 144.
148. Wanda A. Hendricks, Ida B. Wells-Barnett and the Alpha Suffrage Club of Chicago, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, supra
note 15, at 263, 268–69.
149. See DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 193 (explaining how bystanders harassed and
grabbed the women at the parade); ZAHNISER & FRY, supra note 142, at 146–48 (describing how the police did little to stop the “horrible howling mob” of men who
“shoved, jostled, pushed, hooted, jeered” at the women marchers, and broke into the
march line to trip or slap the women).
150. Ford, supra note 143, at 284; Dodd, supra note 142, at 191.
151. Ford, supra note 143, at 286–88. The women’s ordeal is the subject of a book
and a major motion picture. DORIS STEVENS, JAILED FOR FREEDOM (1920); IRON JAWED ANGELS (HBO Films 2004).
152. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at ix; Alisha Haridasani Gupta, How the Spanish Flu
Almost Upended Women’s Suffrage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/04/28/us/spanish-flu-womens-suffrage-coronavirus.html [https://
perma.cc/WW6M-SJJP].
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support and important contributions during the time of war.153 Behind the scenes, the longstanding lobbying efforts of NAWSA congressional liaisons Maud Wood Park and Helen Hamilton Gardener
seemed to finally pay off.154 Democrats had opposed women’s suffrage
in part because they were a party of southern states, where segregation and Jim Crow were still the norm and a new constitutional
amendment threatened to resurrect enforcement of constitutional
prohibitions against race discrimination.155 Wilson, a segregationist,
was attuned to these motives.
Leading white suffragists, too, had played into these racist politics that delayed passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.156 After Reconstruction, the women’s suffrage movement not only “veered away
from its historic connection to black rights,” but affirmatively engaged
in racist politics.157 Suffragists recognized that federal constitutional
suffrage could not be won without the support of southern white politicians, and they adopted campaigns to cultivate white suffrage support in the South at the expense of racial equality.158 Orchestrated by
Henry Blackwell and Laura Clay, of Kentucky, the “southern strategy”
adopted in the 1890s argued for a literacy qualification for voting that
would effectively authorize white women’s vote, while continuing to
exclude most Black people as desired by the southern state governments.159 This strategy fit within the existing states’ rights politics of
the times, but it backfired as it alienated many suffrage women and
153. President Woodrow Wilson, Equal Suffrage: Address of the President of the
United States, Delivered in the Senate of the United States 2–3 (Sept. 30, 1918),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/WilsonSpeech1918
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BBZ-Q9FY]; see TINA CASSIDY, MR. PRESIDENT, HOW LONG MUST
WE WAIT?: ALICE PAUL, WOODROW WILSON, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE 215
(2019).
154. See Wheeler, supra note 117, at 17; KIMBERLY A. HAMLIN, FREE THINKER: THE
EXTRAORDINARY LIFE OF HELEN HAMILTON GARDENER 237, 254 (2020).
155. See DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 151–52.
156. Id. at 151.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 151–54 (“Blackwell was as much an abolitionist as any other suffragist
of his generation. However, his relentless political pragmatism led him to urge southern states still fighting Reconstruction to recognize that ‘four millions of Southern
white women will counterbalance your four millions of negro men and women, and
thus the political supremacy of your white race will remain unchanged.’”); DUDDEN, supra note 37, at 92–93, 232 (detailing Blackwell’s 1867 essay, What the South Can Do:
How the Southern States Can Make Themselves Masters of the Situation, directed to the
“legislatures of the southern states” arguing they could “safely” accept Black suffrage
if they also enacted women’s suffrage which would maintain white control); KRADITOR,
supra note 5, at 163–73.
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race reformers and ultimately proved unsuccessful.160 Into the late
1910s, “the main impediment to Congressional passage of the Nineteenth Amendment was not sex but race—Congressional representatives from all regions and both parties feared the growth of the black
electorate.”161
By the time of Wilson’s belated endorsement for suffrage, midterm elections had put the Republican Party in power, and Republicans endorsed women’s suffrage, as did the Progressive Party of former president Theodore Roosevelt. With this broad partisan support,
the federal woman’s suffrage amendment moved quickly through
Congress. It passed the House in May 1919 and passed the Senate in
June 1919.162 Many states quickly ratified the amendment within a
week of its passage.163
That momentum slowed, however, and by August 1920 the count
was close and came down to one state, Tennessee.164 National supporters and opponents of women’s suffrage converged on Nashville,
wearing yellow roses of support and red roses in opposition.165 The
vote appeared to depend on one man, a young bachelor, Harry Burn,
who wore a red rose of opposition, although he personally favored
suffrage but his constituents did not.166 The story goes that he received a note from his mother just as he was to cast his vote in which
she told him, “Hurrah and vote for suffrage and don’t keep them in
doubt. . . . Don’t forget to be a good boy and help Mrs. Catt.”167 Burn
switched his vote, as did another legislator, and women’s suffrage

160. Wheeler, supra note 117, at 12–13.
161. Hamlin, supra note 8, at 104.
162. H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong. (1919); see also 58 CONG. REC. 635 (1919) (recording
passage of House Joint Resolution 1 in the Senate on June 4, 1919, by a vote of fifty-six
to twenty-five); id. at 93–94 (recording passage of House Joint Resolution 1 in the
House on May 21, 1919, by a vote of 304 to 90).
163. Kolbert, supra note 2, at 537 n.173 (“Notably, state legislatures also moved
with incredible speed to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment.”); CATT & SHULER, supra
note 94, at 334–51 (detailing how many states had to call special legislative sessions
because state assemblies were out of session); see also State-by-State Race to Ratification of the 19th Amendment, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/subjects/
womenshistory/womens-suffrage-timeline.htm [https://perma.cc/CF6B-LLGX].
164. WEISS, supra note 15, at 1.
165. Id. at 198.
166. Id. at 169, 305.
167. Id. at 305–06. Burn’s widowed mother, Phoebe Ensminger Burn, “was a
sharp-witted, college-educated woman who read several newspapers every day and
kept abreast of current events.” Id. at 313.
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passed by the required number of two-thirds of the states.168 Tennessee tried to rescind its ratification, but efforts failed and one week
later on August 26, 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment became law.169
V. RISING FROM THE ASHES AFTER THE NINETEENTH
AMENDMENT
Ratification, however, was not the end of the story. Challenges
were brought to the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment within the
year. In Leser v. Garnett, the Supreme Court rejected states’ rights
claims that the constitutional amendment was unconstitutionally enacted.170 In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court again rejected an attempt of
a private citizen to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment
and its pending enforcement legislation.171 And previously in Hawke
v. Smith, the Court had rejected a claim that state law could mandate
that constitutional amendments like the Eighteenth Amendment be
ratified by public referendum in contradiction to Article V of the U.S.
Constitution, a case with immediate application to the then-pending
Nineteenth Amendment.172 In all of these cases, the Court quickly dismissed challenges and upheld the new women’s suffrage amendment.
The Nineteenth Amendment, however, did not in fact enfranchise
all women or guarantee the right to vote.173 Many women remained
excluded by their race.174 Black women were denied the right to vote
by racist Jim Crow laws like poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and literacy tests that would persist until the Voting Rights Act of 1965.175 Native American women could not vote because they were not deemed
to be citizens of the United States until the 1924 Indian Citizenship
Act.176 Asian American women were denied the right to vote until the
168. Id. at 306–07.
169. Id. at 310–20.
170. 258 U.S. 130 (1922); see MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 36–40; Siegel, supra note
1, at 1005–06.
171. 258 U.S. 126 (1922); see also MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 51.
172. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
173. See MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 1–2; CATHLEEN D. CAHILL, RECASTING THE VOTE:
HOW WOMEN OF COLOR TRANSFORMED THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 7 (2020) (“The amendment . . . simply stated that sex could no longer be used as a reason for denying them
the franchise.”).
174. See MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 1–2, 45; CAHILL, supra note 173, at 7; MARTHA S.
JONES, VANGUARD: HOW BLACK WOMEN BROKE BARRIERS, WON THE VOTE, AND INSISTED ON
EQUALITY FOR ALL 175, 190 (2020).
175. JONES, supra note 174; TERBORG-PENN, supra note 44, at 1–2.
176. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 155–56 n.5; see Cathleen Cahill & Sarah Deer, In
1920, Native Women Sought the Vote: Here’s What’s Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/style/19th-amendment-native-womens
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Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act in 1943 and the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952.177
Congress also failed to pass enforcement legislation for the Nineteenth Amendment, as it had done for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, thus omitting a legal vehicle by which to protect and define the contours of the constitutional right.178 Federal enforcement
legislation for the Nineteenth Amendment introduced into Congress
“raised the specter of a Second Reconstruction among white southerners,” who strongly opposed enforcement legislation as much as they
had opposed the enforcement clause of the suffrage amendment itself.179 Therefore, state courts were mostly left to do the interpretation, even as they were motivated by principles of limited federal
power.180 Despite this, some courts “in the immediate aftermath of
ratification understood the Nineteenth Amendment to redefine citizenship for women in ways that broke with the marital status traditions of the common law.”181 For example, a few courts read the Nineteenth Amendment as “embodying a sex equality norm that had
implications for constitutional questions other than voting,” such as
criminal liability, marital domicile, and contract.182
However, most courts did not read the Nineteenth Amendment
to apply more broadly to women’s political citizenship.183 Many state
courts did not find that voting was “coextensive” with jury or public
service “[p]erhaps fearing the broad social change the Nineteenth
Amendment might signal in the role of women, or its political impact

-suffrage.html [https://perma.cc/ZNM5-MHL6] (noting that while U.S. citizenship was
extended to Native Americans in 1924, many states still enacted policies intent on disenfranchising the Native population).
177. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 155–56 n.5.
178. See id. at 43–67 (analyzing Congress’s failure to enact enforcement legislation,
forcing state courts to interpret the Nineteenth Amendment’s scope); Kolbert, supra
note 2, at 510–28 (exploring modern restrictions to the Nineteenth Amendment to emphasize the need for enforcement legislation).
179. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 8.
180. See id. at 43–67.
181. Siegel, supra note 1, at 1018.
182. Id. at 1012–18 (citing United States v. Hinson, 3 F.2d 200, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1925)
(criminal liability); then citing McCormick v. United States, T.D. 43804, 57 Treas. Dec.
Int. Rev. 117, 125–26 (1930) (Cline, J., concurring) (marital domicile for taxation); then
citing Hollander v. Abrams, 132 A. 224, 229 (N.J. Ch. 1926); and then citing Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 169 S.E. 909, 913 (Va. 1933) (marital domicile for taxation)).
183. See MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 4.
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on state sovereignty.”184 It would not be until 1975 that sex-based barriers to women’s right to serve as jurors would be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.185 Before the amendment’s passage,
women had challenged their limitation of these political rights, such
as the denial of the right to licensure as a public notary.186 After adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, placing women in public office
was one of the first goals of women activists.187
Florence Allen, suffrage activist and lawyer, ran for judicial office
immediately after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.188 She
ran as an independent candidate, missing the primaries and without
endorsement of either political party, but buoyed by the bipartisan
support and campaigning of the women’s suffrage network.189 Allen
became the first woman judge of a general trial court, serving on the
Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland, Ohio, from 1921 to
1922.190 She was subsequently elected to the Ohio Supreme Court for
two terms, was the first woman appointed to a federal appellate court,
being nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
1934, and was the first woman repeatedly shortlisted for the U.S. Supreme Court.191
The advent of the Nineteenth Amendment also failed to force legislators to be responsive to the female electorate. Initially, in the first
year after passage, Congress turned its attention to several issues
raised by the women’s lobby. Women’s organizations formed a loose
184. Id.; see, e.g., People ex rel. Murray v. Holmes, 173 N.E. 145, 147 (Ill. 1930) (stating that “[t]he Nineteenth Amendment has nothing to do with the qualification for service as jurors” as that is “an issue for the state, not federal, government”). See generally
HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S. WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION: A
MORE JUST VERDICT (2014).
185. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535–37 (1975); see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57, 59–65 (1961) (upholding Florida’s statute that automatically exempted
women from juries); LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 3 (1998).
186. See Elizabeth D. Katz, “A Woman Stumps Her State”: Nellie G. Robinson and
Women’s Right To Hold Public Office in Ohio, 53 AKRON L. REV. 313, 314–15 (2019) (noting women’s demand to hold public office as “emblematic of a sustained yet largely
overlooked component of the women’s movement”); Elizabeth D. Katz, Women’s Suffrage and the Legal Right To Hold Office (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
187. See Katz, “A Woman Stumps Her State,” supra note 186, at 315 (noting that one
longstanding goal of the women’s suffrage movement was access to public office).
188. JEANETTE E. TUVE, FIRST LADY OF THE LAW: FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN 53–55
(1984); Thomas, supra note 134 (manuscript at 16).
189. Thomas, supra note 134 (manuscript at 16–17).
190. Id. (manuscript at 17).
191. RENEE KNAKE JEFFERSON & HANNAH BRENNER JOHNSON, SHORTLISTED: WOMEN IN
THE SHADOWS OF THE SUPREME COURT 22 (2020).
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affiliation in the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee to bring
consensus issues of women’s right to Congress.192 Built around the
suffrage consensus on maternalism, the Joint Committee expanded
the issues debated in Congress to include matters of marriage, motherhood, and children.193 It succeeded in securing passage of the Cable
Act, which reinstated national citizenship to American women expatriated when they married non-American men.194 The committee also
achieved success in passing the Sheppard-Towner Act, which designated federal money for maternal and child health care and remedying high infant and maternal mortality rates.195 And they were able to
move forward the constitutional amendment against child labor.196
Congress however quickly learned that women themselves were not
unified on the issues. Women did not vote as a bloc, and women voters
did not hold uniform views, but rather represented the usual spectrum of diverse views seen in men.197 Accordingly, legislators abandoned their efforts to court women voters through women-centered
legislation.198
The impact of the Nineteenth Amendment was also limited by
women suffrage activists themselves. After accomplishing their vote

192. JAN DOOLITTLE WILSON, THE WOMEN’S JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE AND THE
POLITICS OF MATERNALISM, 1920–30, at 19 (2007).
193. See generally id. (examining the Joint Committee’s political campaigns over
time).
194. See KERBER, supra note 185, at 42; Felice Batlan, “She Was Surprised and Furious”: Expatriation, Suffrage, Immigration, and the Fragility of Women’s Citizenship,
1907–1940, 15 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 315, 324–25 (2020) (noting that the Act provides that
a woman’s citizenship will not be dictated by her husband’s citizenship). But see Leti
Volpp, Expatriation by Marriage: The Case of Asian American Women, in FEMINIST LEGAL
HISTORY 68, 72–75 (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) (finding that
the Act “continued to take away U.S. citizenship for women who married a particular
subset of noncitizen men”).
195. See WILSON, supra note 194, at 50; Susan L. Waysdorf, Fighting for Their Lives:
Women, Poverty, and the Historical Role of United States Law in Shaping Access to
Women’s Health Care, 84 KY. L.J. 745, 771–91 (1995–1996) (discussing the SheppardTowner Act as the “pioneer legislation for women’s health”); J. Stanley Lemons, The
Sheppard-Towner Act: Progressivism in the 1920s, 55 J. AM. HIST. 776, 778 (1968) (noting the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee’s vigorous lobbying and contribution
to the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act).
196. WILSON, supra note 194, at 66–89 (describing the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee’s crusade for the Child Labor Amendment).
197. J. KEVIN CORDER & CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, COUNTING WOMEN’S BALLOTS: FEMALE
VOTERS FROM SUFFRAGE THROUGH THE NEW DEAL 51 (2016).
198. See id. (“[A]s it became clear that women’s organizations would not emerge
as an effective force for counter-mobilization, policy concessions dried up.”).
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objective, the suffrage organizations disbanded, splintering into numerous organizations with different and often competing goals.199
The core group from NAWSA established the League of Women Voters, adopting a neutral, bipartisan goal to enroll and educate voters
about the voting process and the issues.200 Social feminists affiliated
with the labor movement, like Florence Kelley of the National Consumers League, focused their efforts on working women, seeking legal
reforms for worker protection laws like maximum hours and minimum wages.201 Early success of this movement in the 1908 case of
Muller v. Oregon based legal advocacy on women’s need for protection
due to their weakness—lesser physical stamina caused by smaller
size, menstruation, and pregnancy, and their social disability caused
by family and housekeeping demands.202 Meanwhile, Alice Paul’s National Woman’s Party turned to advocacy of a new federal equal rights
amendment.203 And progressive feminists expanded their social
agenda broadly to include activism for birth control, economic rights
of profession, global peace, and socialism.204
Black women like Mary Church Terrell and Hallie Quinn Brown
formed organizations to challenge the continued race-based impediments to women voting, as well as issues of lynching and Jim Crow
laws.205 The NWP, League, and labor women rejected overtures to
work in partnership with Black women like Terrell, Brown, and Ida B.
Wells-Barnett to remove racial barriers to women’s voting, because,
199. See id. (noting that once the vote was achieved, female activists were “split
sharply on a number of issues”).
200. Tracey Jean Boisseau & Tracy A. Thomas, After Suffrage Comes Equal Rights?
ERA as the Next Logical Step, in 100 YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT: AN APPRAISAL
OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL ACTIVISM 227, 231 (Holly J. McCammon & Lee Ann Banaszak eds.,
2018); MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 3.
201. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 25; Felice Batlan, Notes from the Margins: Florence
Kelley and the Making of Sociological Jurisprudence, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 239 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010).
202. 208 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1908); see NANCY WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 2 (1996) (showing how social feminists’ success in Muller
was built on women’s weakness and need for protection); NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY
HERSELF: PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR WOMEN WORKERS, 1890s–1990s, at 64–68 (2015) [hereinafter WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF] (reviewing the arguments of the Brandeis brief in
defense of the state in Muller v. Oregon, focusing on statistical studies of the physical
differences between men and women); see also Batlan, supra note 203, at 239 (crediting Florence Kelley in the creation and outcome of the Brandeis brief).
203. Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 200, at 239.
204. NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 44–49 (1987) (tracing the
agenda of feminism in the early 1900s); Thomas, supra note 21 (defining the period of
progressive legal feminism and its agenda).
205. DUBOIS, supra note 5, at 289–90; JONES, supra note 174, at 175.
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Paul said, disenfranchisement of Black women was “a race, not a sex,
matter and of no interest” to their women’s organizations.206 Thus,
soon after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, “it looked as
though Hallie Quinn Brown and the women of the National Association of Colored Women (NACW) had been left alone to drive the next
phase of the fight for women’s votes.”207
Equality feminists instead focused their work on the singular goal
of an equal rights amendment.208 Led by Alice Paul, they first proposed
an equal rights amendment in 1921, just one year after the Nineteenth
Amendment, seeking a blanket amendment that would address all of
the many sex-based legal denials of right.209 The idea had previously
circulated among a radical progressive feminist group, the Feminist
Alliance, in New York City in 1914.210 A committee of thirteen women
attorneys working with Paul identified over three hundred state laws
denying women equal rights, including laws regarding marital property, child custody, jury duty, employment, and education.211
Harkening back to Seneca Falls, these proposals appreciated the
breadth of civil rights denied to women in all institutions of state, family, and the market. The idea of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
was that one blanket constitutional amendment could resolve all of
these questions, rather than taking up each issue separately, as the
Nineteenth Amendment had done for the vote. Social feminists and labor activists, however, opposed the ERA, fearful that legal arguments

206. Id. at 289; see also MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that women suffragist
organizations “failed to respond to the post-ratification requests of African-American
suffragists”); JONES, supra note 174, at 179 (tracing Black women’s role in the suffragist
movement and examining how they were “written out” of the Nineteenth Amendment
revolution); CAHILL, supra note 173, at 218–19; Liette Gidlow, More Than Double: African American Women and the Rise of a “Women’s Vote,” 32 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 52, 58
(2020) (“Faced with disenfranchisement in the early elections after ratification, southern Black women reached out to white former suffragists to no avail.”).
207. JONES, supra note 174, at 175.
208. Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 200, at 229; MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 10.
209. Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 200, at 229.
210. COTT, supra note 204, at 81.
211. Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 200, at 232. The lawyers’ committee was led
by Burnita Shelton Matthews, who in 1949 would become the first woman judge on a
federal district court, appointed to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Linda Greenhouse, Burnita S. Matthews Dies at 93; First Woman on U.S. Trial
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/28/
obituaries/burnita-s-matthews-dies-at-93-first-woman-on-us-trial-courts.html
[https://perma.cc/YN3B-NTP6].
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of equality would undermine and reverse their efforts to protect
women workers on grounds of gender difference.212
This animosity between labor feminists and equality feminists as
to the meaning of gender equality played out in the U.S. Supreme Court
as it initially considered the meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment.
In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the Court overturned a minimum wage
law for women, holding that women were equal with men in employment and thus could not be treated differently.213 This was a rejection
of the Court’s prior holding in Muller v. Oregon that woman was biologically and socially different from man, and thus “properly placed in
a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be
sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men.”214 The
reversal in the Adkins opinion was written by the newly-appointed
Justice George Sutherland, a prominent conservative who had counseled Alice Paul on suffrage and an equal rights amendment and
gained attention as one of the “four horsemen” of Justices who aggressively struck down progressive Depression-era legislation.215 Paul
had input into the briefing for the case, advancing the position of
women’s formal equality with men.216 The Adkins opinion, however,
went beyond this formal equality conclusion, instead recognizing the
Nineteenth Amendment as a structural reversal of women’s common
law disabilities and discrimination.217 It held that women were emancipated from the old doctrine of “the ancient inequality of the sexes”
and the need for special protection or restraint.218 The Court stated:
In view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have taken
place since that utterance, in the contractual, political and civil status of
women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to

212. WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF, supra note 202, at 122; Boisseau & Thomas, supra
note 200, at 234.
213. 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see also WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF, supra note 202, at
112–15; Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women’s Minimum
Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923,
78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 221 (1991) (discussing Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion in Adkins).
214. 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
215. See WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF, supra note 202, at 116; Boisseau & Thomas,
supra note 200, at 235–36; Zimmerman, supra note 213, at 211–13, 219; David E. Bernstein, The Feminist “Horseman,” 10 GREEN BAG 2D 379, 379 (2007).
216. Zimmerman, supra note 213, at 220–21.
217. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 200, at 235–36; Siegel, supra note 1, at
1012.
218. Adkins v. Child.’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923).
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say that these differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing
point.219

The Court thus recognized that the Nineteenth Amendment encapsulated broad citizenship rights for women invalidating the common-law system of coverture designating women legally disabled and
unrecognized.220 But as to the specific ruling in Adkins regarding
women-protective laws, the Court vacillated over the next fifteen
years, upholding some and invalidating others, until it overturned Adkins without ever revisiting the question of the Nineteenth Amendment issue.221
Fast forwarding fifty years, formal gender equality thinking came
to dominate the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Leading thinkers like
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Black lawyer and activist Pauli Murray crated an equal protection jurisprudence analogizing to racebased judicial inquiry that scrutinized formal government action that
discriminated against women or men based on gender stereotype.222
This legal strategy was ultimately successful, as the Supreme Court
beginning in 1971 interpreted the equal protection clause to include
gender discrimination.223 But the “ahistorical” assumptions that gave
rise to this race-gender analogy limited the legitimacy and accuracy of
the subsequent sex discrimination doctrine, treating gender discrimination as the orphaned sister of Reconstruction without its own
meaningful history.224
219. Id.
220. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 1015; MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 5–6, 111; Boisseau
& Thomas, supra note 200, at 235–36.
221. Compare Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1923) (upholding restrictions on
women’s night work), with Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)
(invaliding minimum wage law for women and minors), and W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Adkins and upholding minimum wage law for
women). In West Coast Hotel, the Court upheld gendered laws for women because of
“the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining power
is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances.” 300 U.S. at 398. Congress ultimately answered the gender question by extending workplace protections to all workers in the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122–23
(1941) (upholding FLSA).
222. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 14–20, 63–64 (2011); Julie C. Suk, A Dangerous Imbalance: Pauli Murray’s
Equal Rights Amendment and the Path to Equal Power, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 3, 5
(2021); Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 784 (2004). See generally ROSALIND ROSENBERG,
JANE CROW: THE LIFE OF PAULI MURRAY 342–45 (2017).
223. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 679 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
224. Siegel, supra note 1, at 966, 1022.

2021]

RECLAIMING NINETEENTH AMENDMENT HISTORY

2655

Thus, the Nineteenth Amendment has been legally confined to its
narrow voting topic. Under this “thin” construction of the amendment,
it is read most literally, as not granting a “right” to vote, but “simply
prohibiting the states or the federal government from using sex as a
criterion for voter eligibility.”225 It does not provide a guarantee of
women’s voting that might reach interrelated barriers such as race. It
does not necessarily reach related political rights of jury service or political office. Nor does it reach other public rights such as employment
or education. This thin construction resulted from the advocates’
abandonment of the amendment shortly after its adoption, the failure
to pass enforcing legislation, and from the narrowed constructions
given the amendment by state courts.226
Yet even under this narrow, literal construction, the Nineteenth
Amendment has not been applied to clear cases of gender barriers to
voting. In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld a gendered poll tax exempting women in Breedlove v. Suttles.227 A white man challenged the
Georgia poll tax, intended like most poll taxes to exclude Black voters,
as violative of the Nineteenth Amendment because it exempted
women who did not register to vote.228 The Court upheld the statute
on gendered grounds, justifying the exemption “[i]n view of burdens
necessarily borne by them for the preservation of the race” and because “[t]he laws of Georgia declare the husband to be the head of the
family and the wife to be subject to him.”229 “The issue of gender discrimination in Breedlove was left intact.”230
In 1977, women challenged an Ohio state practice of automatically cancelling a woman voter’s registration at marriage.231 The assumption was that a married woman changed her name, thus invalidating her prior registration in order to prevent voter fraud of double
voting.232 In striking down the practice in Ball v. Brown, the district
court articulated contradictory conclusions as to the legal import of
the Nineteenth Amendment.233 It rejected broader jurisdiction and
225. MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 2.
226. Id. at 1–3.
227. 302 U.S. 277, 279–80 (1937); see also MONOPOLI, supra note 4, at 85–86.
228. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 279–80; see Hasen & Litman, supra note 17, at 34–37
(discussing case).
229. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 282.
230. Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and the
Women’s Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 839, 887 (1998).
231. Ball v. Brown, 450 F. Supp. 4, 9–10 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 7–8. Contra People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642 (Ill. App. 1945)
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class action status for the Nineteenth Amendment claim, yet also held
that it was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.234
More recently, in 2020, a Florida district court upheld a pay-tovote law against constitutional challenge on many grounds, including
the Nineteenth Amendment. In considering the felon voter disenfranchisement law, the federal courts further limited the legal scope of the
Nineteenth Amendment.235 Plaintiffs in Jones v. DeSantis challenged a
state law requiring former felons to pay all of their outstanding fines
before being eligible to vote, even if they showed they could not due
to poverty.236 In addition to claims under the poll tax amendment and
the Fifteenth Amendment, plaintiffs alleged that the law had a disparate impact on women due to gender discrimination in employment
and education and disproportionate family caregiving responsibilities, all making it harder for them to earn money to pay off the fines.237
In considering the Nineteenth Amendment claim, the federal appellate
court restricted the amendment by adopting a “but-for-causation” test
limiting the scope of the amendment even in voting cases.238 “The . . .
Nineteenth Amendment [is] best understood to forbid any voter qualification that makes . . . sex a but-for cause of the denial of the right to
vote” meaning only, according to the court, that sex cannot be a qualification for voting.239 The federal district court had also limited the legal test for the Nineteenth Amendment by imposing a heightened legal
standard of discriminatory purpose or intent due to gender, which it
did not find present in the law targeted at felons generally.240 After
tightening the legal standards, the trial court then held that the real
concern was that “the pay-to-vote requirement overall has a disparate
impact on men, not women” because there are more men than women
who are felons and thus governed by the law.241
(upholding cancellation of voting registration upon marriage for women, and not mentioning the Nineteenth Amendment).
234. Ball, 450 F. Supp. at 8 (“To the extent that the nineteenth amendment provides a further guarantee of the right to vote, that guarantee is encompassed within
the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection under laws prohibiting state
action which invidiously encroaches upon the right to vote.”).
235. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Fla.) (invalidating law on other
constitutional grounds), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th
Cir. 2020).
236. Id. at 1203.
237. Id. at 1239–40.
238. Jones, 975 F.3d at 1042.
239. Id.
240. Jones, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.
241. Id.
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Reading the Nineteenth Amendment this way, using an increasingly thin construction, reinforces the assumption that the Nineteenth
Amendment is not legally meaningful. Legal scholars, however, argue
for a more robust, “thick” construction of the Nineteenth Amendment
that would extend the constitutional law more broadly to rights of
gender equality.242 This thick construction would recognize the Nineteenth Amendment as a complete restructuring of the common law of
coverture, which would then recognize a right to systemic, gender
equality in all aspects of the civil law. Some scholars support this robust construction by a synthetic reading of the Nineteenth and the
Fourteenth Amendments, incorporating the Nineteenth through the
equal protection clause.243 Others argue for a historical, contextual interpretation of the Nineteenth, which would recognize the broad origins of its meaning in the context of Seneca Falls, the Reconstructed
Constitution, and contemporaneous judicial interpretation in Adkins.244 Read this way, the Nineteenth Amendment would be far from
irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
Our collective memory and interpretation of the Nineteenth
Amendment remains blurred, to the detriment of women and their
longstanding demands for equality. At the Women’s Rights National
Historical Park, located in Seneca Falls, a small museum attempts to
trace the entirety of the movement for women’s rights in a handful of
rooms.245 A granite waterfall outside the museum streams water over
the engraved words of Stanton’s Declaration of Sentiments.246 The museum is much smaller than the movement or its import demand. For
the vote was only part of the story, part of the larger movement for
what women demanded of their equality, opportunity, and freedom.
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